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LOYALTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT-
A CONCEPT EMERGES
JAMES E. LEAHY*
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
is written in terms of "freedom of speech," "press," and the right
to "peaceably assemble." In order to bring out the full meaning
of these terms, the Supreme Court has had to designate and elucidate
certain related concepts as being entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection. We thus find the Court, in addition to referring to "speech,"
"press," and "assembly," also using such terms as "association,"
"advocacy," "beliefs," and a somewhat all inclusive term, "expres-
sion." These, the Court has often said, are within the meaning of
the First Amendment and therefore entitled to protection against
action by the federal government, and from state government action
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These concepts have not generally been used when the Court
has been faced with reconciling the governmental interest in security,
such as in the loyalty oath and disclosure cases, with an individual's
rights under the Constitution.
In the recent case of Elffbrandt v Russell,1 however, the
Supreme Court did make use of the "freedom of association" con-
cept. It combined it with certain principles enunciated in a line of
cases which involved the question of "punishment" for membership
in a "subversive" organization. The combining of the "freedom of
association" concept with these principles resulted in a concept
which briefly stated is that government infringement upon "mere
knowing membership, without any showing of 'specific intent,' would
run afoul of the Constitution"' 2 because it "threatens the cherished
freedom of association protected by the First Amendment.. -I
It will be the purpose of this article to examine the cases which
have formed the background for this approach to "loyalty" cases,
and to show its culmination in the Elfbrandt decision.
"Assistant Professor of Law, California Western University. L. L. B. 1949, North
Dakota.
1. 384 U. S. 11 (1966).
2. Id. at 16.
3. Id. at 18.
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An examination will first be made of the "association" cases
in which the Court has been called upon to determine under what
circumstances an individual can be "punished ' 4 for membership
in a "subversive ' 5 organization. A look will then be taken at the
cases where the Court has had to decide whether "freedom of as-
sociation" prohibited the forced disclosure of membership lists to
the government. It will be shown how the principles stated in
these cases were merged into the concept that was then used by
the Court to decide the Elffbrandt Case. An attempt will then be
made to restate this Concept in somewhat broader terms and to
analyze the "loyalty" cases heretofore decided by the Court to
determine what effect it would have had upon them. Finally, a
suggestion that will be made that this Concept provides a better
approach to the "loyalty" cases than that used in the past, and
that it therefore ought to be used in such cases in the future.
"FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION"
"Freedom of association" is generally thought of in connection
with membership in an organization, although this is not a necessary
characteristic. One might be "associated" with other individuals
in a non-organizational manner and his "freedom of association"
might then be involved.7 Infringement by the government, federal
or state, upon "freedom of association," however, usually reaches
the Supreme Court with one of three possible factual situations.
One, the government seeks to determine an individual's member-
ship in, or (2) to punish him for membership in, a "subversive"
organization. The third situation is where the government seeks to
have an organization (or an individual member thereof) reveal the
names of its members. In these cases the government asserts that
"punishment" for such membership, as in the first situation, or
disclosure of membership, as in the second and third situations
is necessary because of a governmental interest which is greater
than the rights of the individuals or organizations involved.
4. Punish as used here Is not confined to criminal penalties, but includes de-natural-
ization, deportation, and "Deprivation or suspension of political or civil rights
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322 (1867).
5. The word "Subversive" will hereinafter be used as a short term to refer to
activity aimed at the overthrow of the government by force or violence.
6. The word "Concept" or "Elfbrandt Concept" will hereafter be used to refer to the
basis of the decision in the Elfbrandt Case, supra, note 1, as hereinafter restated.
7. See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1936) Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S.
72 (1958).
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"PUNISHMENT" FOR INDIVIDUAL MEMBERSHIP
IN A "SUBVERSIVE" ORGANIZATION
The question to be explored here is: Under what circumstances
has the Supreme Court approved or disapproved governmental
action punishing an individual for membership in a "subversive"
organization?
Whitney v Californla
Charlotte Whitney was tried and convicted for violating the
California Criminal Syndicalism Act, which was aimed at preventing
industrial or political changes through commission of crimes or un-
lawful acts of force, violence or terrorism. The statute made it a
felony for "any person who: 4. organizes or assists in organizing,
or is or knowingly becomes a member of, any organization . . of
persons organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet
criminal syndicalism. ."'
The defendant was charged and convicted of a violation of this
section because she had become a member of, and assisted in or-
ganizing the Communist Labor Party of California, which was
found to have been organized to advocate, teach or aid and abet
criminal syndicalism as defined in the statute.
She contended, however, that there was no showing of specific
intent on her part to participate in the illegal purpose of the Com-
munist Labor Party To this the Court replied that the examination
of the evidence, even though foreclosed by the verdict of the jury,
clearly showed that she knew and acquiesced in the purposes of
the Party
The Court discussed the Constitutional objections of violation of
due process, and equal protection, and found no such violation. It
then turned its attention to the First Amendment and stated that
the essence of the offense against the defendant was "the combining
with others in an association for the accomplishment of the desired
ends through advocacy and use of criminal and unlawful methods." 10
What the Court is saying is that there is more to this offense than
just membership. There was here, knowledge together with some
activity aimed at upsetting the peace and welfare of the state.
Justice Brandeis in a concurring opinion, in which Justice Holmes
joined, was struck with the fact that this statute was aimed at
''association."
8. 274 U.S. 357 (1926).
9. Id. at 360.
10. Id. at 871-2.
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The novelty in the prohibition introduced is the statute
alms, not at the practice of criminal syndicalism, nor even
at the preaching of it, but at association with those who
propose to preach it."'
After reviewing the background of the First Amendment, Justice
Brandeis continues,
I am unable to assent to the suggestion in the opinion of
the Court that assembling with a political party, formed to
advocate the desirability of a proletarian revolution by mass
action at some date necessarily far in the future, is not a
right within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.12
Even though the statute was a novel one and they had doubts
whether just assembling to advocate the desirability of mass revo-
lution at some time far in the future could be punished, both justices
agreed with the majority that the evidence was sufficient to find
the "existence of a conspiracy which would be furthered by activity
of the society of which Miss Whitney was a member ""
While this case does not set forth any clear principles indicating
under what circumstances an individual may be "punished" for
membership in an organization considered "subversive," it does
appear from both opinions that at least in this case there was
something more than just membership. 14
Justice Brandeis pinpointed the real problem, however, when
he questioned whether an individual could be punished for being
a. member of an organization "formed to advocate the desirability
of a proletarian revolution by mass action at some date necessarily
far In the future. "15
Schneiderman v United States
6
Twelve years after Schneiderman had been granted a certificate
of citizenship, the government brought suit to have it cancelled on
11. 1. at 373.
12. Id. at 379.
13. Id. at 379.
14. But See, Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 225, n.16 (1960) for what might
be a contrary opinion.
15. 274 U.S. 357, 379. Several other Criminal Syndicalism cases reached the Court
about this time, none of which are particularly helpful in the analysis undertaken here.
These cases are Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328 (1926) Fiske v Kansas, 274 U.S.
380 (1926) and DeJonge v. Oregon, supra note 7. DeJonge, however, did involve the
legality of a conviction because the defendant, "Assisted in the conduct of a public meeting,
albeit otherwise lawful, which was held under the auspices of the Communist Party."
(p. 362) The Court reversed the conviction relying upon the First Amendment's provision
regarding the right to peaceable assembly It might be said that in this case the seeds of
the right of association were being nurtured. See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, at 523,
528 (1959).
16. 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
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the ground that it was illegally procured. The government charged
that during the five years preceding his naturalization the petitioner
had not behaved as a person attached to the principles of the Con-
stitution. Specifically the government charged that, "[petitioner]
was a member of and affiliated with and believed in and supported
the principles of certain organizations then known as the Workers
(Communist) Party of America and the Young Workers (Communist)
League of America. ",17 These organizations, the government
claimed were "subversive."
In discussing the petitioner's conduct during the five years in
question, the Court noted that he had been a law abiding person,
had not been arrested, nor involved in any disorders. "The sole
possible criticism is petitioner's membership and activity in the
League and the Party, but those memberships qua memberships
were immaterial under the 1906 Act."'L8 Noting that the First
Amendment protects the right of free discussion and free thinking
the Court points out that with the exception of the membership in
these organizations, there was no evidence by conduct or statements
that petitioner believed in or advocated "subversive" action as a
means of attaining political ends.
There not being any direct evidence that the petitioner himself
advocated "subversive" action, the government sought to show that
the organizations with which he was actively affiliated did advocate
the overthrow of the government. The Court upon examining the
evidence concluded that the issue was in some doubt as to whether
the organization with which the petitioner was affiliated called for
''present violent action which creates a clear and present danger"
as opposed to "mere doctrinal justification or prediction of the
use of force under hypothetical conditions at some indefinite future
time. ."19 Thus the Court held that the government had failed
to show that petitioner was not attached to the principles of the
Constitution and therefore could not be de-naturalized.
The Schneiderman Case was followed in two more recent cases
containing similar facts. They are Nowak v United States,20 and
Maisenberg v United States.2' In Nowak the Court again found that
the government had not established its case, i.e. that Nowak knew
of the Party's illegal advocacy Thus "the fact that Nowak was an
active member and functionary in the Party does not of itself suffice
to establish this vital link in the Government's chain of proof. ' '22
17. Id. at 121-2.
18. Id. at 134.
19. Id. at 157.
20. 356 U.S. 660 (1958).
21. 356 U.S. 670 (1958).
22. Supra note 20, at 666.
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These three cases indicate that where the government is attempt-
mg to inflict "punishment," here de-naturalization, upon an indi-
vidual, more is required than just proof of membership. Even as-
suming that it could be proved that the Communist Party was a
"subversive" organization during the time that the individuals were
members thereof, there was not sufficient proof that these persons
knew of the Party's illegal advocacy Therefore their citizenship
could not be taken away
These decisions rested upon the failure of the government to
prove that the individuals were not attached to the pnnciples of
the Constitution. No investigation of "freedom of association" was
therefore made by the Court.
"MEANINGFUL ASSOCIATION"
There have been several cases involving the question of depor-
tation of aliens for membership in the Communist Party In Galvin
v Press,2 1 the petitioner urged the Court to construe the Internal
Security Act, which provided for deportation of aliens who are mem-
bers of the Communist Party, as requiring deportation only of those
aliens who joined the Party knowing of its purposes and who by
such joining committed themselves to this violent purpose. This the
Court refused to do, construing the statute instead as requiring only
"that the alien joined the Party, aware that he was joining an
organization known as the Communist Party which operates as a
distinct and active political organization, and that he did so of his
own free will." While this seems to indicate that the petitioner's
knowledge concerning the Party's advocacy of violent overthrow of
the government was of no import, the opinion does go on to say
that "the record does not show a relationship to the Party so nominal
as not to make him a 'member' within the terms of the Act."12
5
The case of Rowoldt v Perfetto,28 is similar to Galvin, except
that here, even though the membership in the Communist Party
was established, the Court held that that was not enough to make
the alien deportable. There must be a "meaningful association"27
the Court says in order to support a deportation order
The Rowoldt Case was affirmed in Gastelum-Quinones v Ken-
nedy, Atty. Gen.28 In a footnote to this case29 Justice Goldberg
who wrote the majority opinion, states that Galvin and Rowoldt
23. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
24. Id. at 528.
25. Id. at 529.
26. 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
27. Id. at 120.
28. 874 U.S. 469 (1963). ,
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are not inconsistent. He calls attention to the fact that in Rowoldt,
Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority opinion there, distm-
guished the two cases because of a difference in facts. This would
imply that while membership in Galvin was meaningful, it was not
so in Rowoldt or Gastelum-Quznones.
Although these cases were all decided on grounds other than
the First Amendment, they are of importance here to demonstrate
what the Court has been doing in the area of "punishment" for
membership in a "subversive" organization. These cases indicate
that even in deportation cases, the membership must be more than
just membership. It must be a "meaningful association."
Schware v Board of Bar Examiners30
Petitioner Rudolph Schware was denied permission to take the
New Mexico Bar examination on the ground that he had failed to
prove good moral character Investigation had revealed that he had
used certain aliases, had been arrested but never convicted, and
that from 1932 to 1940 had been a member of the Communist Party.
Without discussing "freedom of association" under the First
Amendment, the Court held that it was a denial of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment not to give the petitioner the
opportunity to qualify for the practice of law
There was nothing in the record, however, which indicates
that he ever engaged in any action to overthrow the Govern-
ment of the United States or of any State by force or
violence, or that he even advocated such actions.81
Although this was a unanimous decision, Justice Frankfurter
wrote a concurring opinion in which Justices Clark and Harlan
joined. To these Justices, there was a denial of due process because
the Supreme Court of New Mexico had erroneously concluded that
the petitioner's several years of loyalty to the Communist Party
made him a person of questionable character. To the rest of the
Court (Justice Whittaker did not participate) neither the member-
ship in the Communist Party, nor the use of aliases, nor the arrests,
nor all three of these combined justified a finding that petitioner
was of bad moral character and thus not qualified to practice law
Although Schware contended that demal of his application on
the grounds of his membership in the Communist Party was a
violation of his "freedom of association," the Court did not pass
29. Id. at 478.
30. 853 U.S. 232 (1956).
31. Id. at 245-6.
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upon that contention. Rather the case was decided solely upon due
process grounds. The Court, however, did discuss two points that
are pertinent here: (1) that the state could not use as evidence
against the petitioner what may or may not have been proved in
another case to which the petitioner was not connected, and (2)
that even assuming that some members of the Communist Party
had engaged in illegal activities, this may not be true of all members.
In connection with this last point the Court stated, " 'indiscriminate
classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an as-
sertion of arbitrary power.' ",32 Thus it can be seen that the Court
was concerned about how meaningful Schware's membership in the
Communist Party actually was.
"KNOWING .ACTIVE, NOT NOMINAL, PASSIVE OR THEORETICAL"
The question of the approval or disapproval of governmental
action punishing an individual for membership in a "subversive"
organization received its most direct treatment in the case of Scales
v United States.3 3 In this case the defendant was convicted under
the membership clause of the Smith Act, which provides for a fine
and imprisonment for one who, "becomes or is a member of, or
affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons,
knowing the purposes thereof. , Such society, group or assembly
meaning a "subversive" society as hereinbefore defined.
The Court construed the statute as not punishing "membership
in Communist organizations, as such, but only in organizations en-
gaging in advocacy of violent overthrow" and then only those
members " 'knowing the purposes thereof,' " and who are "active,
and not nominal, passive or theoretical.. .,85
Having thus narrowly construed the statute, the Court turned
to the Constitutional objections. As to the claim of the violation of
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Court concluded that
the statute sufficiently met that requirement in that it reached
only "active" members having also guilty knowledge and intent.
This the Court states "prevents a conviction on what otherwise
might be regarded as merely an expression of sympathy unac-
companied by any significant action. ,,36
Turning to the claim of the violation of the First Amendment,
the Court disposed of that principally on the basis of Dennis v
32. Id. at 246.
33. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
34. Id. at 205.
35. Id. at 207-8.
86. Id. at 228.
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United States,87 that if the advocacy, not of abstract doctrine, but
advocacy of action could be punished there, there was no reason
why membership, knowing and active, could not be punished here.
We can discern no reason why membership, when it con-
stitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging
in this same forbidden advocacy, should receive any greater
degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amend-
ment. 38
The analysis which the Court uses here to sustain the statute
from due process attack, leaves the implication that had the statute
not been construed to reach only "active" members, it would not
have withstood due process scrutiny Further, the reference to the
Dennis Case standard, i.e. advocacy of action as sustaining those
convictions, and "active" membership to sustain this conviction also
implies that without those qualifying terms, the conviction would
not have met First Amendment standards.
Justice Black in dissent concluded that the Act violated the First
Amendment which "absolutely forbids Congress to outlaw member-
ship in a political party or similar association *)SO just because
that organization believes in the overthrow of the government at
some future date.
To Justice Douglas the matter was equally clear What was
being done here was "legaliz (ing) guilt by association, sending
a man to prison when he committed no unlawful act.
' 40
"INTENT"
In the Scales Case, supra, the Court examined in detail the
sufficiency of the evidence concerning whether or not the Communist
Party was engaged in the present advocacy of violent overthrow of
the government. The conclusion was that the evidence was sufficient.
On the same day that the Court decided that case, it decided the
case of Noto v United States,41 but reached an opposite conclusion.
The Court took the position that a defendant must be judged on
the evidence at his own trial and not what may have been found to
be true in another trial. On this basis the conviction was set aside.
Whether the defendant was an "active" member was not spe-
cifically determined, nor was the First Amendment discussed. The
Court does, however, point out that in a membership clause prose-
37. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
38. Supra note 33, at 229.
39. Id. at 260.
40. Id. at 268.
41. 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
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cution whether the defendant had the requisite criminal intent is a
requirement. And that this element
[M]ust be judged strictissims jurts [so that] one in
sympathy with the legitimate aims of such organization, but
not specifically mtending to accomplish them by resort to
violence, might be punished for adherence to lawful and
constitutionally protected purposes, because of other un-
protected purposes which he does not necessarily share. 42
This implies again that membership in a "subversive" organi-
zation does have some constitutional protection, but from which
amendment is not stated.
"KNOWING AND UNKNOWING MEMBERS"
Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act was before the
Court in Aptheker v Sec. of State.4 3 This Section made it unlawful
for any member of a Communist organization (which was registered
or ordered to register) to make application for a passport, or a
renewal thereof, or to make use of one already held. After passage
of the Act the State Department notified the petitioners that their
passports were revoked. They brought this action to have this section
of the Act declared unconstitutional.
The Court, after pointing out that the right to travel was part
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, held that the
Act was unconstitutional on its face. It swept too broadly, and in-
discriminately across the liberty guaranteed in the Fifth Amend-
ment. Among the objections which the Court found was that "the
section applies whether or not one knows or believes that he
is associated with an organization operating to further aims of the
world Commumst movement '"4 and thus "sweeps within its pro-
hibition both knowing and unknowing members.1 45
MEMBERSHIP CASES REVIEWED
This somewhat detailed review of the membership cases since
Whitney, indicates that where membership in a "subversive" organi-
zation is used as a basis for "punishment," the Court has required
a showing of more than membership per se. Even in Whitney, the
Court including Justices Brandeis and Holmes were able to find a
"meaningful association."
42. Id. at 299-300.
43. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
44. Id. at 510.
45. Id. at 510.
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These cases, however, do not formulate with any precision a
definite standard. In the de-naturalization cases, such as Schneider-
man, Nowak, and Maisenberg, the missing link was the establish-
ment of "knowledge" on the part of the individuals of the Party's
illegal purposes. The deportation cases, Galvin, Rowoldt, and Gaste-
lum-Quinones, set forth a requirement of "meaningful association"
which means something more than just knowledge.
The Schware Case, gives no test, except the Court does indicate
that indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity
could not stand.
A standard of some precision is put forth in Scales, although not
a Constitutional one. In construing the Smith Act the Court read it
as punishing only those members of the Communist Party who knew
the purpose thereof and who were "active, and not nominal, passive
or theoretical."
In Noto, the Court talked about the "intent" and in both Scales
and Noto the Court required evidence that the Communist Party
was engaged in the advocacy of the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment. A similar point was also made in Schware.
The vice of Aptheker was also that it did not distinguish between
"knowing and unknowing" members.
Certainly these cases indicate that just membership itself in a
"subversive" organization is not a sufficient justification for "punish-
ment." The Supreme Court has not always reached this result on
Constitutional grounds. And when the Court has found that the govern-
mental action did violate the Constitution resort has been had to
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than the First
Amendment concept of "freedom of association."
DISCLOSURE OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP
As pointed out above, the problem in these cases generally arises
when the government attempts to secure a list of the members of
a certain organization, or makes inquiry of an individual about
certain of his associations. They are important to our analysis be-
cause it is in these cases that the concept of "freedom of association"
is most fully articulated.
Bryant v Zimmerman"
In this case there was an attack upon a New York statute which
required organizations, which had an oath as a prerequisite to mem-
bership, to file with the state, a roster of its members. The Supreme
46. 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
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Court upheld the law stating that it did not violate the Constitutional
provisions concerning privileges and immunities, due process, or
equal protection.
The defendant did raise the question of the invasion of his right
of membership in the association, but the Court summarily dismissed
this, stating that "his liberty in this regard must yield to the
rightful exertion of the police power, '4 7 thus indicating that if there
were a right of association the governmental interest was greater
Watkins v United States
48
This case has a slightly different factual situation than the
"membership" cases hereinafter discussed, but is important from
the point of view that the First Amendment was discussed by the
Court. The decision, however, was finally based upon a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The petitioner was testifying before a Congressional Committee
investigating "subversive" activities. He testified freely about his
own activities and associations, but refused to answer questions as
to whether he had known other persons to have been members of
the Communist Party He did not plead the protection of the Fifth
Amendment's provision against self-incrimination, but asserted that
no law required him to testify about others, and further that such
questions were not relevant.
The Court in agreeing with the petitioner, on the issue of rele-
vancy, discussed at some length the First Amendment's freedom
of speech, press, religion and political belief and association and
concluded that "the First Amendment may be invoked against in-
fringement of protected freedoms by law or law making.
'49
The Court then decided the matter upon due process grounds,
holding that the petitioner was unable to determine from the pro-
ceedings whether he was within his rghts in refusing to answer
This case while not decided on the basis of a Constitutional
"freedom of association" gives recognition that such a concept is
within the meaning of the First Amendment and entitled to Con-
stitutional protection.
The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to
testify, against his will, about his beliefs, expressions, or
associations is a measure of governmental interference. 50
47. Id. at 72.
48. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
49. Id. at 197.
50. Id. at 197.
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NAACP v Alabama"1
It is in this case that "freedom of association" finally emerged
as a concept within the First Amendment and thus entitled to its
full protection. This case arose out of the attempt by Alabama to
force the NAACP to reveal its membership lists. The NAACP, m
resisting this, claimed the right to assert the rights of its members
from compelled disclosure of their affiliation with the Association.
The Court unanimously agreed with the NAACP and held that
the Constitution prohibited such forced disclosure using as a basis
for its decision the First Amendment as applied to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage m association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech. Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs
sought to be advanced by association pertain to political,
economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to as-
sociate is subject to the closest scrutiny 52
Especially of concern to the Court was the effect of compulsory
disclosure on the individual's affiliation with the Association, noting
that "privacy in group association may in many circumstances be
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly
where a group espouses dissident beliefs. 5 3
Not finding a sufficient justification for disclosure, the Court
held that the NAACP could not be held in contempt for refusing
to produce its membership lists.
In two substantially similar cases, Bates v Little Rock, 54 and
Loutsiana, ex rel Germilloin, Atty Gen. v NAACP,55 the Court again
rendered unanimous decisions that the government could not force
disclosure of membership lists of the NAACP In both cases the
Court relied upon the concept of "freedom of association" as the
basis for its decision.
Communist Party v Subversive Activities Control Board"
When the Court believes that the governmental interest is greater
than the individual's "freedom of association," it has required regis-
51. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
52. Id. at 460-1.
53. Id. at 462.
64. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
55. 366 U.S. 293 (1951).
56. 867 U.S. 1 (1961).
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tration and disclosure of membership lists. This is the essence of
the decision reached in Subpart B of Part V of the opinion in this
case.
The Control Board had entered an order requiring the Communist
Party to register as a communist-action organization. Registration
would have included giving the names and addresses of the officers
and members of the Party In reaching its decision the Court was
not unaware of such cases as NAACP and Bates. They were
distinguishable the Court said, "in the magnitude of the public in-
terests which the regulation and disclosure provisions are designed
to protect. ,,57
The Court accepted the findings of Congress that the government
was menaced by a world-wide integrated movement. Thus the Act
was sustained against a First Amendment attack.
Gibson v Florida Legis. Investigation Committee"
The State of Florida, through a legislative investigating com-
mittee was investigating the infiltration of Communists into various
organizations operating in Florida. The petitioner, Gibson, as cus-
todian of the records of the NAACP there, was ordered to appear
before the Committee and bring with him the records of the Associ-
ation. He appeared, but did not bring the records, declaring that
he would not produce them for the purpose of answering questions
concerning membership in the NAACP He answered questions as
to his personal knowledge testifying that he could not associate with
the NAACP any of the 14 persons about which inquiry was made
of him.
The Court held that the "freedom of association" as enunciated
in NAACP and Bates, and other cases, still applied to this case.
The entire thrust of the demands on the petitioner was that
he disclose whether other persons were members of the
NAACP, itself a concededly legitimate and non-subversive
organization.59
There being no evidence of any connections between the NAACP
and "subversive" or other illegal activities, the Court upheld the
petitioner's right to withhold the records.
To permit legislative inquiry to proceed on less than an
adequate foundation would be to sanction unjustified and
unwarranted intrusions into the very heart of the constitu-
57. Id. at 93.
598. 72 U.S. 539 (1963).
59. Id. at 548.
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tional privilege to be secure in associations in legitimate
organizations engaged in the exercise of First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.. 60
In order to reach this conclusion the Court was called upon to
distinguish several cases wherein an individual's contempt conviction
was upheld because he refused to disclose to a Congressional in-
vestigating committee his own membership in the Communist Party
This caused Justice Douglas to comment in a concurring opinion
that the opinion of the Court "is carefully written within the frame-
work of our current decisions." 61 Both he and Justice Black, how-
ever, would have placed greater emphasis upon the "freedom of
association" concept. The decisions which the Court refers to will
be discussed hereafter.
Uphaus v Wyman62
This case came to the Court with a factual situation somewhat
unlike the cases discussed above. While the subject matter of the
investigation was "subversive" activity, the disclosure requested
was not membership in an organization.
The Attorney General of New Hampshire was conducting an
investigation into "subversive" activities within the state. The ap-
pellant, who maintained a summer camp in New Hampshire was
called to testify He was ordered to produce certain records of his
camp relating to his nonprofessional employees and to give the
names of all persons who attended the camp during the period of
time under investigation. He refused to supply this information.
In upholding the request for disclosure against the right of associ-
ation the Court concluded that the interests of the state in self
preservation was greater
This governmental interest outweighs individual rights in an
associational privacy which, however real in other circum-
stances, cf. National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People v Alabama, supra, were here tenuous at
best."
60. Id, at 558.
61. Id. at 559.
62. 360 U. S. 72 (1959).
63. Id. at 74.
64. Id. at 80.
65. 871 U.S. 415 (1963).
66. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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NAACP v Button, 5 and
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virgtntal
These two cases represent another facet of "freedom of associ-
ation." In the Button Case the NAACP sought review of certain
Virginia laws regulating the legal profession. These laws forbid
"solicitation of legal business by a 'runner' or 'capper' [which
terms] include . an agent for an individual or organization which
retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it is not
a party and in which it has no pecuniary right or liability. ' 67
The NAACP carried on a program of assisting in litigation
aimed at ending racial segregation. It had been active in this area
in Virginia for more than 10 years. The state contended that these
activities fell within the statutes and therefore were illegal. The
Court held otherwise basing its decision on the freedoms of the
First Amendment, stating that "the activities of the NAACP, its
affiliates and legal staff shown on this record are modes of expression
and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. *"68 As the Court saw it, associating for litigation may
be an important form of political association.
Nor did the Court agree with the state's contention that its
interest in regulating the legal profession was greater than the
"freedom of association."
We conclude that although the petitioner has amply shown
that its activities fall within the First Amendment's protec-
tions, the State has failed to advance any substantial regula-
tory interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing from
petitioner's activities, which can justify the broad prohibition
which it has imposed.69
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen Case, supra, extended
the "freedom of association" of the Button Case to a situation
where the state sought an injunction against a labor union which
was actively engaged in advising its injured members to secure
legal assistance and in recommending specific lawyers to handle
their claims. In vacating the injunction granted by the State Court,
the Supreme Court, in referring to the Button Case, states,
The Brotherhood's activities fall just as clearly within the
protection of the First Amendment. And the Constitution
67. Supra note 65, at 423.
68. Id. at 428-9.
69. Id. at 428-9.
70. Supra note 66, at 8.
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protects the associational rights of the members of the
union precisely as it does those of NAACP. 70
GROUP DISCLOSURE CASES REVIEWED
These cases indicate that there is now a "freedom of association"
concept in full bloom, and that the government cannot violate it
without "a compelling state interest m the regulation of the subject
matter ' '7 1 attempted to be regulated. The Court has been more
readily able to find an overriding governmental interest when the
government is directing its investigation at "subversive" activity,
except that even then the Court drew a distinction in the Gibson
Case, between those investigations of a "subversive" organization
itself and an investigation of infiltration of subversives into an
admitted nonsubversive organization. The Court upheld the disclosure
in the former, but prohibited it in the latter.
THE MAKING OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT
If we combine the principles enunciated by the "group disclosure"
cases, just discussed, with the "punishment" cases discussed before,
we find a Constitutional Concept which may be phrased as follows:
the First Amendment protects an individual from governmental
infringement upon his "freedom of association" either by (1) "punish-
ment" for membership in a "subversive" organization, or (2) by
disclosure of such membership unless (A) that association was a
"meaningful association" or (B) there is a "compelling" govern-
mental interest in the matter to be regulated that even a "mere
member" may be "punished" or required to disclose membership.72
The idea of such a Concept, of course, is not new. Its seed
can be traced as far back as Whitney v California, where Justice
Brandeis stated,
I am unable to assent to the suggestion in the opinion of the
Court that assembling with a political party, formed to advo-
cate the desirability of a proletarian revolution by mass
action at some date necessarily far in the future, is not a
right within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.7
3
71. NAACP v. Button, supra note 65, at 438. See also Emerson, Freedom of Association
and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1 (1964) Douglas, The Right of
Association, 63 COLUMBIA LAW REViEW 1361 (1963) Rice, The Constitutional Right of
Association, 16 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 491 (1965).
72. I have adopted the language in the Rowold Case, 355 U.S. 115 (1957) to include
"with knowledge of illegal advocacy" (de-naturalization cases) "meaningful association"
(Rowoldt) , "active, and not nominal, passive or theoretical" (Scales) and with "Intent"
(Noto). The term "mere member" will be considered to mean something less than
"meaningful association" for the rest of this paper.
73. 274 U.S. at 379 (1926).
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Justice Brandeis found indication in the majority opinion "that
to knowingly be or become a member of or assist in organizing
an association ' 74 to advocate "subversive" action at some future
date might be punishable. With this he disagrees, and what he
seems to be saying in reply is that the First Amendment, by virtue
of the Fourteenth, would protect an individual in such a situation
against governmental action.
As indicated above, and as will be further explored below, there
have been other assertions that the First Amendment does protect
individual association with "subversive" organizations.7 5
THE CONCEPT IN FULL BLOOM
As indicated at the beginning of this paper, the recent case of
Elfbrandt v Russell, illustrates the merger of two principles and
the formulation of a Concept. Let us then, examine that case in
more detail.
By statute employees of the State of Arizona were required to
take an oath of allegiance. When enacting the oath statute, the
legislature attached certain provisions under which an employee
taking the oath could be punished. This legislative gloss subjected
to punishment (prosecution for perjury and discharge) an employee
"who took the oath and who 'knowingly and willfully becomes or
remains a member of the communist party ' or 'any other
organization' having for 'one of its purposes' the overthrow of the
government where the employee had knowledge of the unlawful
purpose." 7 6
In meeting the Constitutional question, the Court cites such
cases as Scales, Noto, and Aptheker, for the proposition that, "mere
knowing membership, without any showing of 'specific intent,' would
run afoul of the Constitution. . . "71 Applying this to the Arizona
oath, with the legislative gloss, the Court finds that it "suffer[s]
from an identical constitutional infirmity." 8
Nothing in the oath, the statutory gloss, or the construction
of the oath and statutes given by the Arizona Supreme
Court, purports to exclude association by one who does not
subscribe to the organization's unlawful ends.7 9
74. Id. at 371.
75. See dissenting opinions of Justice Black and Douglas in Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. at 259, 263 (1961) and of Justice Black in Comm. Association v. Douds, 339 U.S.
at 445 (1950).
76. 384 U.S. 11, 13 (1966).
77. I& at 16.
78. Id. at 16.
79. Id. at 16.
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The Constitutional significance of this, the Court states is
This Act threatens cherished freedom of association protected
by the First Amendment, made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment."
Among the cases cited in support of this are two cases to be
discussed hereafter, and NAACP and Gibson.
To conclude its decision the Court states,
A law which applies to membership without the 'specific
intent' to further the illegal aims of the organization m-
fringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms. It rests on the
doctrine of 'guilt by association' which has no place here.
See Schneiderman v United States, 320 US 118, 136; Schware
v Board of Bar Examiners, 353 US 232, 246. Such a law
cannot stand.""
Thus we have the culmination of an idea that may have actually
started with Justice Brandeis in Whitney, but seems to have gotten
lost or clouded along the way
One cannot accept this, however, and store it away for future
use, without first examining the cases cited by Justice White in the
first paragraph of his dissent in the Elfbrandt Case. 2 These cases
and others need to be explored in the light of this Concept.
THE LOYALTY CASES RE-EXAMINED
There are two types of "loyalty" cases that should be examined
in the light of the Elfbrandt Concept. The first are the usual loyalty
oath cases, here confined to those having to do with membership,
and second the cases where the government seeks to have an mdi-
vidual disclose whether or not he is, or was a member of a "sub-
versive" organization. The loyalty oath cases will be examined first.
Loyalty Oath Cases
Communication Association v Douds,8 Osman v Douds'
In these two cases the Court was called upon to determine the
legality of Section 9(H) of the National Labor Relations Act which
required as a condition to the utilization of the Act by a union that
each of its officers file an affidavit with the Board, "that he is not
80. Id. at 18.
81. Id. at 19.
82. Id. at 19-20. See also Justice Clark's dissent In Aptheker, 878 U.S. at 527.
83. 389 U.S. 382 (1950).
84. 339 U.S. 846 (1950).
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a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party,
and that he does not believe in, and is not a, member of or supports
any organization that believes in or teaches," 85 "subversive" action.
It was a criminal offense to knowingly file a false affidavit.
In .he first Douds Case the membership portion of the oath
was held not to violate the First Amendment by 5 of the 6 justices
who participated in the decision. Only Justice Black dissented on
this point.
In discussing the First Amendment generally, the Court placed
great emphasis upon the fact that what Congress was intending
to regulate was not speech at all but conduct. To sustain this the
Court cites many First Amendment cases in which regulation of
conduct was permitted even though there was also a regulation of
speech.
The Court continues its discussion of freedom of speech, but
never really seems to come to grips with any "freedom of associ-
ation" issue. The opinion does point out, however, that the "statute
does not prevent or punish by criminal sanctions the affiliation
with any organization" 86 and that its general discussion of the
First Amendment, as it applied to the beliefs portion of the oath,
was also intended to apply to the membership clause.
The Court also acknowledged that restrictions upon speech were
not justified unless substantial interests of society were at stake.
In this case the effect upon the First Amendment's freedoms were
small and the public interests were concluded to be substantial.
Justice Jackson in concurring as to the validity of the member-
ship clause does so upon making a detailed analysis of "the decisive
difference between the Communist Party and every other party of
any importance in the long experience of the United States with
party government." 87
Justice Black's dissent was based upon the grounds that this
oath violated the First Amendment's freedoms of belief and associ-
ation. His position being "that penalties should be imposed only for
a person's own conduct, not for his beliefs or for the conduct of
others with whom he may associate. Guilt should not be imputed
solely from association or affiliation with political parties or any
other association, however much we abhor the ideas which they
advocate.",8
When the first Douds Case was decided, Justices Douglas, Clark,
and Minton did not participate. Thus Section 9 (H) was back before
85. 339 U.S. at 386.
86. Id. at 402.
87. Id. at 422.
88. Id. at 452.
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the Court again in Osman v Douds, supra, wherein it was again
sustained. This time Justices Douglas and Minton participated,
with Justice Minton joining in upholding the validity of both the
membership and beliefs portions of Section 9(H), whereas Justice
Douglas joined those holding the beliefs portion unconstitutional.
Thus the membership clause was sustained by a 7 to 1 majority
and the beliefs clause by a 4 to 4 tie.
If the Concept suggested above had been used here it would
have required the Court to declare the membership clause uncon-
stitutional because the oath is not confined to the type of membership
envisioned in the Concept. In other words Section 9 (H) contains no
provision restricting the holding of union office only to those having
a "meaningful association" with the Communist Party. Thus the
oath did not exclude membership by a person who did not subscribe
to its illegal purposes.
It is to be noted, however, that the Court did place stress upon
its determination that the effect upon First Amendment freedoms
was slight, and the public interest substantial. In attempting to
draw a line between those situations where there is a "compelling"
governmental interest and those where there is not, the minds of
men will differ. In view of the fact that this question arises in this
case and will arise in many of the cases hereinafter to be discussed,
it will not be discussed here, but will be taken up in a later portion
of this paper and all of the cases will be discussed together Another
pertinent question in this case and in those to be examined here-
after is whether the detriment which the individual suffers because
of the governmental requirement of a loyalty oath or disclosure of
membership in the Communist Party is "pumshment." This question
was discussed quite thoroughly in Cummings v. Missouri, where
the Court said,
We do not agree with the counsel of Missouri that 'to punish
is to deprive him of life, liberty, or property, and that to
take from him anything less than these is no punishment
at all.' The learned counsel does not use these terms-life,
liberty, and property-as comprehending every right known
to the law He does not include under liberty freedom from
outrage on the feelings as well as restraints on the person.
He does not include under property those estates which
one may acquire in professions, though they are often the
source of the highest emoluments and honors. The depriva-
tion of any rights, civil or political previously enjoyed, may
be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes
of the deprivation determing this fact .... Disqualification
89. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320. See also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
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from the pursuits of a lawful avocation, or from the privilege
of appearing in the courts may also, and often has been
imposed as punishment. 9
This is not a question of an individual having a right to hold
union office, to public employment, to be a member of the Bar, or
to teach. The question is, to what extent can an individual be
"punished" for the exercise of a Constitutional "freedom of associ-
ation."
That the Court had this broad concept in mind in Elfbrandt is
evidenced by the fact that it cites the Schneiderman and Schware
Cases, in neither of which was the detriment suffered by the indi-
vidual a criminal penalty
Gerende v Election Board(
The State of Maryland had a statute requiring each candidate
for public office to file an affidavit that he or she was not a
"subversive" person, as defined in the statute, before such persons
name could appear on the ballot. This statute was construed by
the Maryland Supreme Court to mean "that to obtain a place on a
Maryland ballot a candidate need only make oath that he is not a
person who is engaged 'in one way or another in an attempt to
overthrow the government by force or violence,' and that he is not
knowingly a member of an organization engaged in such an
attempt."9'
When the case was argued before the Supreme Court, the
Maryland Attorney General stated that he would advise the proper
authorities to accept the affidavit in the terms laid down by the
Maryland Court. On this basis the Supreme Court upheld the oath
in a Per Curiam opinion.
This oath, even though narrowly construed by the Maryland
supreme court does not meet the requirements of the Concept. It
does not distinguish between types of memberships. It is true that
the construction of the oath limited its application to knowing mem-
bers, but it does not limit it to those who though being knowledgeable
have some "meaningful association" with the aims and activities
of the "subversive" organization.
Garner v Board of Public Works of Los Angeles
2
The City of Los Angeles required each city employee to take
an oath by which he affirmed, among other things, " 'that I am
90. 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
91. Id. at 56-7 (Underscoring indicates italics in orginal).
92. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
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not now and have not been or become a member of or affiliated
with any organization or party which advises, advocates or
teaches. " "subversive" action. The employee was also re-
quired to affirm that he would not become a member of a "sub-
versive" organization while employed by the City In addition he
was required to execute an affidavit giving information as to whether
he was or had been a member of the Communist Party of the
United States. Thus it can be seen that while the oath pertained
to membership in a "subversive" organization, the affidavit re-
quired disclosure of membership present or past in the Communist
Party For our purposes here we will treat only the oath part of
the ordinance and discuss the disclosure affidavit hereafter.
The oath was sustained against an attack that it was uncon-
stitutional as a bill of attainder, ex post facto law, and violated
due process. The Court did not discuss "freedom of association"
except to point out that it had "no reason to suppose that the oath
will be construed as affecting adversely those persons
who during their affiliation with a proscribed organization were
innocent of its purpose. -94 Scienter, the Court believed was
implicit within the oath.
Applying the Concept to this case would result in a decision
that the oath was unconstitutional. Even though scienter is assumed
to be part of the oath, it should be examined to determine its
effect upon one whose membership is less than "meaningful." An
employee who was a "mere member" would be unable to take
the oath and thus would be subject to discharge.
Wieman v Updegraff95
All employees of the State of Oklahoma were required to take
an oath affirming that they were " 'not affiliated directly or in-
directly with any foreign political agency, party, organization
or Government, or with any organization, association or group
which has been officially determined by the United States
Attorney General to be a communist front or subversive
organization. ' "96 The employee was further required to state
that he had not been a member of such an organization. This
statute was interpreted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court as refer-
ring only to those organizations which were on the list at the time
of the passage of the Act.
93. Id. at 718-19.
94. Id. at 723.
95. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
96. Id. at 186.
97. Id. at 190.
98. Id. at 190.
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The employees who had previously refused to take the oath
then appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court for permission to
take it as so construed. This the Court refused. Thus in effect
these employees were being required to take the oath in the terms
of the statute as enacted. Since the Oklahoma Supreme Court should
have had before it the Supreme Court's decision in Garner, the
Supreme Court concluded that knowledge was not a part of the
Oklahoma statute.
With that analysis as a basis, the Court discusses membership,
although not necessarily in "freedom of association" terms, but in
due process terms. The Court makes an inquiry "whether the Due
Process clause permits a state, in attempting to bar disloyal
individuals from its employ, to exclude persons solely on the basis
of organization membership, regardless of their knowledge concern-
Ing the organizations to which they had belonged. For, under the
statute before us, the fact of membership alone disqualifies. ,,sT
In answering this inquiry the Court notes that "membership may
be innocent. A state servant may have joined a proscribed organi-
zation unaware of its activities and purposes." 's8
It is clear that in its classification here of "innocent" member-
ship the Court means only that the individual did not know of the
assumed illegal purposes of the organization. This "indiscriminate
classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an
assertion of arbitrary power The oath offends due process."99
The Oklahoma oath violated due process because it touched
innocent membership, meaning membership without knowledge con-
cerning the activities and purposes of the organization. It would
also have violated the Concept, for the same reason, except it
would have been upon the First Amendment's "freedom of associ-
ation" rather than due process.
Cramp v Board of Public Instruction °"
The following oath, which was part of a Florida statute, was
before the Court in this case:
I do hereby swear or affirm that I am not
a member of the Communist Party; that I have not and will
not lend my aid, support, advice, counsel or nfluence to the
Communist Party that I am not a member of any "sub-
versive" organization.0 1
The petitioner did not attack the membership provisions recited
99. Id. at 191.
100. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
101. Id. at 279. n.i. (Underscoring indicates italics in original).
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above. In fact in his complaint he stated he was not a member of
the Communist Party, nor of any other "subversive" organization.
He did, however, contend that the portion of the oath italicized
above, "impinges upon his constitutionally protected right of free
speech and association, and that the language of the required oath
is vague and uncertain as to deny him due process of law "102
After deciding a standing question, the Court turned its attention
to the merits of the petitioner's due process claim. The Court noted
that in a previous case the Supreme Court of Florida had held
that there was an element of scienter here. With that understanding
and confining its discussion to the portion of the oath italicized
above, the Court agreed with the petitioner that the statute violated
due process.
Those who take this oath must swear that they have not
in the unending past ever knowingly lent their 'aid,' or 'sup-
port,' or 'advice,' or 'counsel' or 'influence' to the Commun-
ist Party 103
The vice of this, of course, was that no one could ever honestly
be sure that he had never given "aid" etc. to some cause the
Communist Party also supported.
Recognizing that the vice of unconstitutional vagueness may
inhibit individual freedoms, the Court does not spell out which
freedoms it is referring to, although several First Amendment cases
are cited.
The application of the Elfbrandt Concept to the membership
provision of this oath would have required the Court to reach the
same decision that it did. The oath refers to membership in the
Communist Party, or other "subversive" organizations, but does
not distinguish between a "meaningful association" and just mem-
bership per se.
Baggett v Bullett10'
Two oath statutes required by the State of Washington were
before the Court in this case. For our discussion, however, only
the 1955 statute and the oath promulgated thereunder is pertinent
because that statute and oath contains a membership clause. The
1931 oath statute did not.
The 1955 statute required an oath from state employees who
were required to swear that they were not a subversive person as
102. Id. at 282.
103. Id. at 286.
104. 877 U.S. 360 (1964).
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defined in the statute, or that they " 'with knowledge that the or-
ganization is an organization as described in subsection (2) and
(3) hereof, becomes or remains a member of a subversive organiza-
tion or a foreign subversive organization.' "l05
The oath form required to be signed by the employee contained
this statement, " 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am not
a member of the Communist Party or knowingly of any other
subversive organization.' "06
Treating this as a case similar to Cramp, the Court held that
it was just as unconstitutionally vague as the statute stricken
down in that case.
The Court does not discuss the membership clause of either
the 1955 statute, or the oath form promulgated thereunder Yet
the Elfbrandt Concept would require the same decision that the
Court did reach, i.e. that the statute violated the Constitution, here
the First Amendment "freedom of association."
The opinion does however refer to "the hazard of being prose-
cuted [punished] for knowing but guiltless behavior ,I07
Thus again recognizing the principle which is the essence of Part
(a) of the Concept.
Adler v Board of Education" 8
Although this is not an oath case, it falls within the classification
of "loyalty" cases and therefore ought to be examined in the light
of the Elfbrandt Concept.
New York State had adopted a detailed loyalty program for
its employees called the Feinberg Law This law provided, among
other things, that membership in a "subversive" organization made
an individual ineligible for state employment. Subdivision (c) of
Section 12-A reads as follows:
'(c) Organizes or helps to organize or becomes a member
of any society or group which teaches or advocates that
the government of the United States shall be overthrown
by force or violence, or by any unlawful means. '109
Another section of the law provided that the Board of Regents
shall, after holding a hearing, promulgate a list of the organizations
it finds to be "subversive." Evidence of membership in any organi-
105. Id. at 362.
106. Id. at 364, n.3 and 4.
107. Id. at 373.
108. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
109. Id. at 487, n.3.
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zation on the list would be prima facie evidence of disqualification
for a position in the school system.
A declaratory action was brought to have the law declared
unconstitutional upon grounds that it violated freedom of speech,
assembly and due process. As to the question of the violation of
the First Amendment because of the membership provision, the
Court adhered to its decision in the Garner Case. And while the
Court admitted that one's freedom of choice between membership
and employment might be limited by a statute such as the Feinberg
Law, the Court believed that that limitation is one that the states
could make under their police power
The question of the effect of the part of the statute whereby
membership is prima facie evidence of disqualification was also
discussed and it was pointed out that the presumption was not
conclusive. The Court emphasizes this fact by quoting the New York
Court of appeals to the effect that " 'the phrase prima facie evidence
of disqualification imports a hearing at which one shall
be afforded an opportunity to present substantial evidence contrary
to the presumption sanctioned' "1.10 by the statute.
On this basis the Court did not find any Constitutional infirmity
in the law Justice Douglas, however, dissented in an opinion joined
by Justice Black. He points out that "a teacher is disqualified be-
cause of her membership in an organization found to be 'subversive.'
The findings as to the 'subversive' character of the organization
is made in a proceeding to which the teacher is not a party and
in which it is not clear she may even be heard.""'
This is a difficult case in which to apply the Concept, because
it does appear that once membership in an organization declared
"subversive" has been established, the employee is given a hearing.
In such hearing, the membership is only prima facie evidence of
disqualification. This seems to imply to the Court that if the employee
could furnish a good explanation for the membership, then mem-
bership alone would not be grounds for disqualification. If this
in effect means, that disqualification for "mere membership" would
not be allowed, and that a "meaningful association" must be
established before disqualification then the statute would meet the
Elfbrandt Concept.
This, of course, is not answered by the Court's opinion. Nor
is there an answer to the question raised by Justice Douglas. It
appears that an employee wishing to object to the inclusion of a
certain organization on the Board of Regents list, would have had
llO. Id. at 495.
111. Id. at 508-9.
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to appear at the hearing held by the Board when it determined
what organizations to include on the list. If he did not do so,
apparently the establishment of the "subversive" characteristic of
the organization would be conclusive in any hearing the employee
had as to his eligibility for employment. In Noto, which is a later
case, and also a criminal one, the Court stated that one must be
judged on the evidence at his own trial, and not what may have
been found in another one. The same point was made m Schware,
which also was a later case but not a criminal one.
Summarizing the "loyalty oath" cases discussed here it appears
that the application of the Concept would have required the oaths
to be held invalid in Douds, Gerende, and Garner. In Wieman,
Cramp, and Baggett, the Court would have reached the same
decision that it did but on First Amendment grounds.
The Adler Case seems not to lend itself to a clear decision
either way, under the Concept. If the employee could not be dis-
qualified by "mere membership" the decision would withstand the
Elfbrandt test, leaving the question raised by Justice Douglas un-
answered.
Cases Concerning Disclosure of Indivzdual Membership
In a number of cases going back to Garner, the Court has been
faced with the question whether or not an individual can be
required to disclose present or past membership in the Communist
Party In all of the cases, except two, the Court held that disclosure
could be required, being of the opinion that the governmental
interest in the subject matter being regulated was sufficient.
In some of the cases the governmental interest was the desire
of the government to have qualified employees, such as city em-
ployees and teachers. In other cases it was the public need for
trustworthy lawyers. Where the disclosure was requested during a
governmental investigation of "subversive" activities, the public
interests were held greater than the individual's rights, and dis-
closure was again directed. In a recent case, however, the Court
held that an individual need not disclose whether or not he was a
member of the Communist Party prior to the effective date of
the state law relating to "subversive" investigations.
In the Garner Case, in addition to taking an oath, the Los
Angeles City employees were required to execute an affidavit stating
whether they were or ever had been a member of the Communist
Party. Against an attack that the affidavit requirement violated
freedom of speech and assembly, the Court concluded that there
was nothing m the Constitution that precluded such an inquiry.
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Membership in the Communist Party, past or present was pertinent
to the employee's fitness for employment. The Court carefully
pointed out, however, that it was not deciding whether an employee
could actually be discharged for disclosure of such a political af-
filiation.
The question was presented again in Beilan v Board of Educa-
tion,112 but here the individual, Mr. Beilan, was a teacher At two
different times he had been summoned into his superintendent's
office and asked whether he had held a certain position in the
Communist Political Association. He refused to answer this question
each time. The Superintendent warned Mr Beilan that if he refused
to answer he might be dismissed. He still refused and was eventu-
ally discharged.
The Supreme Court, relying upon its decision m Garner affirmed
the dismissal, pointing out that Mr. Beilan was discharged for m-
competency because of being insubordinate and lacking in frank-
ness and candor
The question whether an applicant for a license to practice
law can be required to disclose past or present membership in the
Communist Party has been before the Court in three cases:
Konzgsberg v State Bar of CalifornLa,1 s3 Konigsberg v State Bar of
California,1 1 4 and In Re Anastaplo."15
In the first Konigsberg Case the Court read the record as
indicating that Mr Konigsberg's application was denied because
the applicant "failed to demonstrate good moral character and
failed to show he did not advocate" 116 "subversive" action. It was
therefore specifically determined by the Court that the Committee
of Bar Examiners did not deny Konigsberg's application simply
because he refused to answer questions with regard to membership
in the Communist Party
It was upon that analysis of the record that the Court examined
the evidence and agreed with the applicant that it did not support
the two grounds relied upon by the Committee in denying him
admission to the Bar The decision was therefore arbitrary and
discriminatory thus violating the Due Process Clause.
When the case was remanded to the California supreme court,
it was referred to the Committee of Bar Examiners for further
consideration. Additional hearings were held and the applicant was
again questioned about his past or present membership in the Com-
112. 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
113. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
114. 366 U.S. 36 (1961). Hereafter referred to as Konigsberg I.
115. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
116. 353 U.S. 252, 259.
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munist Party. He again refused to answer This time in denying
the application the Committee specifically stated that it was doing
so because of the applicant's refusal to answer the questions.
Thus the groundwork was laid for a specific determination by
the Supreme Court of the question whether refusal to answer ques-
tions about ones political associations could be used as a ground
for the demal of a license to practice law The Court's conclusion
was that the state could inquire into the possibility of Party member-
ship and that denial of a license upon refusal to disclose such
association or non-association was not a demal of due process.
Konigsberg had also contended that under the First Amend-
ment's protection of free speech and "association" he could not be
compelled to answer questions propounded dealing with Party
membership. After pointing out that freedom of speech and "associ-
ation" have never been treated as absolutes, the Court stated that:
[G]eneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the
content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered
exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the
First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade. when they have
been found justified by subordinating valid governmental
interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality.. ... 117
In the light of this the Court concluded that the interest of
the state
[I]n having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its
broadest sense, including not only its substantive provisions,
but also its procedures for orderly change, as clearly suf-
ficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free association
occasioned by compulsory disclosure in the circumstances
here presented. 8
In Re Anastaplo, is a case similar to Konigsberg II. Anastaplo
was denied admission to the Bar of Illinois upon his refusal to
answer questions put to hin by the Bar Examining Committee,
concerning possible membership in the Communist Party The Com-
mittee had been supplied with uncontroverted evidence of his good
moral character.
Konigsberg II settled two of the issues in this case, i.e. a state
can adopt a rule refusing admission to the Bar if the applicant
obstructs the work of the Committee by refusing to answer material
questions, and the interests of the state in such a case outweighs
117. Supra note 114, at 50-51.
118. Supra note 114, at 52.
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the deterrent effect upon freedom of speech and "association."
Anastaplo argued further, however, that he was not given
adequate warning as to the consequence of refusal to answer the
questions relating to the Communist Party, and even so his refusal
to answer did not obstruct the work of the Committee because it
already had sufficient evidence of his good character
As to the first of these contentions, the Court concluded that
he had been adequately warned. As to the second, the Court found
nothing in the Constitution that required the Committee to conclude
its investigation having once secured evidence of good moral
character
Barenblatt v United States,"19 and DeGregory v Atty. Gen. of
N H., 120 involve the question of whether an individual may be requir-
ed to answer questions concerning membership in the Communist
Party, during an investigation of "subversive" activities. In Baren-
blatt, the investigation was being conducted by a Congressional
Committee investigating the alleged infiltration of Communists into
education. The petitioner, Barenblatt, was called to testify and after
answering a few preliminary questions refused to answer questions
directed to the question of his being a member of the Party He re-
fused to answer the questions basing his refusal on a claim that the
questions infringed protected rights under the First Amendment.
In answer the Court pointed out that the First Amendment does
not give an absolute right to refuse to answer relevant questions
propounded in an investigation such as this. There is a balancing
issue involved here the Court said between public and private
interests. In matters such as here the Communist Party, the Court
notes, has always been viewed as different from an ordinary
political party
We conclude that the balance between the individual and
the governmental interest here at stake must be struck in
favor of the latter, and that therefore the provisions of the
First Amendment have not been offended.i n
The DeGregory Case arose in New Hampshire where the
Attorney General was conducting an investigation of "subversive"
activities within the state, under a statute enacted in 1957 DeGregory
was called before the Attorney General and answered questions
concerning his relationship with Communist activities since 1957,
119. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
120. 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
121. Sup'ra note 119, at 134. This case was followed in Wilkinson v. United States, 865
U.S. 399 (1961), and Braden v. United States, 865 U.S. 431 (1961).
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but refused to answer any questions about his associations prior
to that date. He did so basing his refusal upon his First Amendment
rights. With this the Court agreed:
There is no showing of "overriding and compelling state
interest" (Gibson v Florida Legislative Comm. 372 US 539,
546) that would warrant intrusion into the realm of political
and associational privacy protected by the First Amend-
ment.
122
The case of Shelton v Tucker,1 23 presents the question of indi-
vidual disclosure in a somewhat different factual setting. Here an
Arkansas statute required teachers in state supported schools or
colleges, "to file annually an affidavit listing without limitation
every organization to which he has belonged or regularly contri-
buted within the preceding five years.' 1 24
The statute was attacked by several teachers upon the grounds
that it violated their rights to personal, associational, and academic
liberty In upholding this contention the Court states that the
"unlimited and indiscriminate sweep of the statute brings it
within the ban of our prior cases. The statute's comprehensive
interference with associational freedom goes far beyond what might
be justified m the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into
the fitness and competency of its teachers.' ' 25
Setting aside for a moment the question of the balancing of
the governmental interests against the rights of the individual, the
application of the Elfbrandt Concept in all of these cases, except
DeGregory and Shelton, would have brought about a decision con-
trary to the decision the Court did reach. The inquiry was not
confined to whether there was a "meaningful association" under
any of the criteria set forth in the "punishment" cases heretofore
discussed.
This question was raised in Konigsberg II, where the petitioner
contended that "the questions as to Communist Party membership
were made irrelevant by the fact that bare, innocent member-
ship is not a ground of disqualification. ",126 The Court answered
this by referring to the Committee Chairman's statement to the
petitioner and his Attorney The Committee Chairman had told
Konigsberg that if he had acknowledged that he was a member
of the Communist Party, "the Committee would then be in a position
122. Supra note 120, at 829.
123. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
124. Id. at 480.
126. Id. at 490.
126. Supra note 117, at 46.
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to ask you what acts you engaged in to carry out the functions
and purposes of the Party "V127 The Chairman further pointed
out that a whole new area of investigation might have been opened
up, if they had been able to determine whether petitioner was a
Communist Party member.
This is not a sufficient answer when tested against the Elfbrandt
Concept. Under that Concept Konigsberg would have had a freedom
to be a member of the Communist Party for which he could not
have been "punished" unless it was first determined that his was
a "meaningful association." It being only "meaningful association"
that the state could punish the Elfbrandt Concept would have re-
quired that the petitioner be questioned only to determine whether
such "meaningful association" did in fact exist, thus giving pro-
tection to the "freedom of association." The inquiry therefore should
have been directed to determining whether the petitioner was an
active member in any organization which he knew advocated the
overthrow of the government by force or violence.
The end sought to be achieved in these disclosure cases is the
desire of the state to protect itself from "subversive" activity.
Restricting the questioning to information concerning the individuals
present, knowing, active conduct would give the state the informa-
tion it needs to protect its interest and at the same time not infringe
upon the individual's "freedom of association." As the Court pointed
out in Elfbrandt, "those who join an organization but do not share
its unlawful purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful
activities surely pose no threat, either as citizens or public
employees." 129
Shelton v Tucker confirms this approach. The Court there
stated:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved.12 8
What has been said here applies with equal force to the other
disclosure cases. What the Court has permitted in these cases is
the "punishing" of an individual for not disclosing membership in
an organization for which under the Concept (if the membership
was known) the same "punishment" could not have been inflicted
127. Id. at 46.
128. Supra note 123, at 488. (Underscoring added).
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unless the membership was a "meaningful association." Further-
more, assuming in these cases that the membership has been dis-
closed, as the Court pointed out in Schware and explicitly held in
Noto, one must be judged by the evidence in his own case. This
would have required the government in each instance not only to
show "meaningful association" but that the Communist Party was
a subversive organization, before the individual could be "punished."
In Barenblatt, Wilkinson, and Braden, the individuals were crimi-
nally punished for non-disclosure of membership, for which if dis-
closure had been made, they could not have been "punished" unless
the association was "meaningful" and the government could prove
that the Communist Party was a "subversive" organization.
Because the minds of men will differ on the question of whose
interests are greater, those of the government or of the individual,
the Concept seeks to focus the inquiry not upon "mere membership,"
which may be nominal, passive or theoretical but upon knowing,
active membership which is a "meaningful association," the purpose
of which is "subversive" activity Only in those cases where there
is a "compelling" governmental interest would the Concept allow
the individuals "freedom of association" to be subordinated.
In applying this to all of the "loyalty" cases hereinbefore
discussed, the governmental interest should have been found to be
inferior to the individuals "freedom of association" because there
is no "compelling" governmental interest that could not have been
adequately protected by requiring inquiry only as to knowing,
active membership.
The point can be illustrated by the use of the facts of the
Schware Case where Schware's membership in the Communist Party
was admitted. He had, however, quit the Party some 14 years prior
to making his application to take the New Mexico Bar examination.
The Court had no difficulty in determining that his Constitutional
rights had been violated, although the decision was based upon
due process grounds. There clearly was no "meaningful association"
in this case.
Suppose, however, that Schware had been a member of the
Party until one day prior to submitting his application. Would the
governmental interest now be greater, thus giving New Mexico
sufficient grounds for refusing to allow him to take the Bar exami-
nation? If the answer to that question is yes, then at what point
in time between fourteen years and one day does the membership
become so meaningful that the governmental interest is then
superior' Under the Elfbrandt Concept, this difficult question need
129. 884 .8. at 17 (1966).
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not be answered because the issue would not be raised in that
manner. The inquiry would be directed as to whether the applicant
was a knowing, active member of an organization advocating
"subversive" action. If the answer to that question is no, that con-
cludes the matter as far as further questioning on that subject is
concerned. If the applicant is not truthful he would be subject to
whatever penalties any applicant would be subjected to for giving
false information to the Committee. This protects both the state's
interest and the individual's "freedom of association."
SUMMARY
The Elfbrandt Case seems to be the merging of the principles
of the "punishment" cases and the concept of "freedom of associ-
ation" noted by Justice Brandeis in Whitney, but really developed
in the first NAACP Case and subsequent cases. Although the Elf-
brandt Case does not clearly define the Concept, nor state its
boundaries, an attempt has been made here to do so by an examma-
tion of the cases that form the background for the Concept. As
shown, there are a line of cases in which the Court has been called
upon to determine under what circumstances an individual can be
"punished" for membership in a "subversive" organization. In
developing these cases the Court has required that there be a showing
of "knowledge of illegal advocacy;" that the membership be "active,
and not nominal, passive or theoretical;" and that there be "specific
intent" to further the illegal purposes of the organization. All of
these are bound up with the phrase "meaningful association."
As this principle was being developed by the Court there was
also emerging a First Amendment "freedom of association" through
the group disclosure cases heretofore discussed. Thus we see the
Court on the one hand requiring something more than membership
before an individual could be "punished" and on the other hand a
fast developing "freedom of association" which was entitled to pro-
tection under the First Amendment. The merging of these two
principles bring into full bloom, the Concept that: the First Amend-
ment protects an individual from governmental infringement upon
his "freedom of association" either by (1) "punishment" for mem-
bership in a "subversive" organization, or (2) by disclosure of such
membership unless (a) that association was a "meaningful associ-
ation" or (b) there is a "compelling" governmental interest in
the matter to be regulated that even a "mere member" may be
"punished" or required to disclose membership.
If this Concept had been applied to the loyalty oath and disclosure
cases heretofore decided by the Court it would have resulted in a
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series of decisions which would have given greater protection to
"freedom of association," yet at the same time, would have allowed
the government to protect itself against "subversive" activity The
Concept would have required the focus to be upon whether the
individual was engaged in a "meaningful association" for the purpose
of "subversive" activity If he were not, his "freedom of association"
would have been protected and the governmental interest in self
preservaton would have been preserved.
The use of the Concept in future cases of this type will provide
a more definite standard than balancing each case, because the
emphasis will be upon the individual's actions rather than upon his
mere association with unpopular causes.
